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GRISWOLD AND THE 
DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
BRADLEY P. JACOB* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There can be little doubt that our nation is locked in culture wars,1 es-
pecially concerning sexual and family issues, with two very different views 
of the Good Life competing in the marketplace of ideas.2  The traditionalist 
side believes that a family unit should consist of a husband and a wife, 
married for life except in unusual circumstances, raising children who have 
come into the home by birth or adoption.3  Sexual conduct is viewed as a 
wonderful gift from God,4 but a gift that was designed for use within a 
monogamous, heterosexual marriage.5  The progressive side believes that 
 
*Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law.  B.A., summa cum laude, University 
of Delaware; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.  This article on marriage, like most things 
of value in my life, would not be possible without the support of my beloved J.J., an amazing 
woman who has been the perfect wife of a far-less-than-perfect lawyer for a quarter of a century.  
Thanks to Dean Jeffrey A. Brauch, Regent University School of Law, and the American Center 
for Law and Justice for their support in preparing this article, and to the North Dakota Law 
Review for sponsoring this symposium issue.  Special thanks to Jaired B. Hall, Regent Law 
School Class of 2008, for excellent research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it no 
business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.”); 
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA passim (1991); 
Richard Jensen, The Culture Wars, 1965-1995: A Historian’s Map, 29 J. SOC. HIST. 17 passim 
(1995), available at http://members.aol.com/dann01/cwar.html (“We are at the midpoint of the 
Culture Wars, with the lines of battle clearly delineated for all to see, but with the ultimate win-
ners and losers still to be decided.”); see also David E. Campbell, A House Divided? What Social 
Science Has to Say About the Culture War, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 59, 59 (2006) 
(explaining that, while the United States may not be as politically or culturally polarized as many 
claim, the term Culture War was “originally meant to convey . . . a tremendously significant 
development in American religion, society, and politics”). 
2. There is, however, some room for disagreement about what portion of the American 
public is passionate about one of these competing worldviews, and what portion holds to a largely 
uninterested middle ground.  MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, 
CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 7-9, 15-32 (2004). 
3. See, e.g., Wayne Allard, Protect Traditional Marriage, USA TODAY, May 31, 2006, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-05-31-opposing-view_x.htm; 
LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE passim (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Song of Solomon 1:2-4, 7:1-9. 
5. Matthew 19:4-6 (NIV). 
“Haven’t you read,” he replied, “that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them male 
and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be 
united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’?  So they are no longer two, but 
one.  Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate.” 
Id. 
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sexual activity is unconnected to marriage and should be enjoyed by any-
one, in any circumstances that seem attractive, at least among consenting 
adults.6  Progressives view marriage either as an irrelevant anachronism7 or 
an institution for sexual legitimacy that ought to be redefined to include any 
desired combination of numbers and sexes.8 
The culture war battles have impacted a number of legal fields, but 
none more than family law and constitutional law.  This article focuses on 
issues arising under the Constitution of the United States.  Part II discusses 
the appropriate venues and methods for deciding controversial public policy 
issues under our constitutional system.  Part III examines the sources of 
individual rights under the Constitution.  Part IV concludes by putting all of 
this in the context of the culture wars and the modern sexual revolution, 
suggesting that Griswold v. Connecticut9—generally reviled by cultural 
traditionalists for its creation of the “right of privacy” which led to such 
decisions as Roe v. Wade,10 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 and Lawrence v. Texas12—may have been a much 
stronger precedent for traditional morality and marriage than is generally 
assumed—if only the Supreme Court had taken Griswold on its own terms. 
 
6. Some more extreme proponents of progressive morality would not limit sexual conduct to 
consenting adults.  For example, the “North American Man/Boy Love Association (‘NAM/BLA’) 
is an organization which advocates sexual relations between men and boys and the repeal of laws 
which restrict such relations.”  North American Man/Boy Love Ass’n v. FBI, No. 82 CIV 2185, 
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13944, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
7. Dennis E. Powell, Divorce-on-Demand: Forget about Gay Marriage—What about the 
State of Regular Marriage?, NAT’L. REV., Oct. 27, 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_m1282/is_20_55/ai_108892930/print (“Marriage is an anachronism. It’s a tax status. 
Nothing more.”); see also John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker’s Tour of Divorce Law, 48 ME. L. 
REV. 7, 48 (1996) (“The nuclear family belongs to the past; similarly, marriage seems not long for 
the present.”). 
8. Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, available  at 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/938xpsxy.asp.  (“Unlike 
classic polygamy, which features one man and several women, polyamory comprises a 
bewildering variety of sexual combinations.  There are triads of one woman and two men; 
heterosexual group marriages; groups in which some or all members are bisexual; lesbian groups, 
and so forth.”). 
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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II. WHERE AND HOW TO FIGHT THE CULTURE WARS 
The battles of the culture wars are played out on many fronts—in 
academia, in movies and television, and in churches,13 to name just a few.  
From a legal perspective, conflicts over the future of marriage and family, 
like most other major legal battles, take place in two arenas: the political 
branches of government (primarily legislatures, but also occasionally 
executive and administrative bodies), and the courts.14  The battles in the 
political arena, while certainly hard-fought and controversial in terms of 
outcome, are not particularly controversial in terms of process.  Most 
people, even the strongest advocates on both sides, generally agree that it is 
appropriate for the political process to be used to resolve public policy 
disputes.  Our system is based on representative democracy, so we accept 
that each side in a political debate will be attempting to persuade a majority 
in the appropriate decision-making body that its position is the correct 
one.15  The side that wins has won fair and square.  As Supreme Court Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia, certainly a well-known proponent of the traditionalist 
position, has said: 
By the time Coloradans were asked to vote on Amendment 2, their 
exposure to homosexuals’ quest for social endorsement was not 
limited to newspaper accounts of happenings in places such as 
New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Key West.  Three 
Colorado cities—Aspen, Boulder, and Denver—had enacted 
ordinances that listed “sexual orientation” as an impermissible 
ground for discrimination, equating the moral disapproval of 
homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry.  The phe-
nomenon had even appeared statewide: The Governor of Colorado 
had signed an executive order pronouncing that “in the State of 
Colorado we recognize the diversity in our pluralistic society and 
strive to bring an end to discrimination in any form,” and directing 
 
13. A current example is the debate over homosexuality within the American Episcopal 
Church, which is threatening to create a permanent divide within the worldwide Anglican 
Communion.  Anglican Conference: Rwanda Church Drops Out, WASH. POST, July 7, 2007, at 
B9, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/06/ 
AR2007070601838.html; Rebecca Trounson, Anglican Archbishops: No Consensus on Episcopal 
Church, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/ 
nation/la-na-episcopal15dec15,1,1720359.story?coll=la-headlines-nation. 
14. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 41 (“Enlisted Personnel Separations”) (July 1, 1993 
Edition), Appendix A (“Standards and Procedures”), Part 1 (“Reasons for Separation”), subpart H 
(“Homosexuality”). 
15. This decision-making body could be the United States Congress, a state legislature, a city 
council, an administrative rule-making body, or, in the case of a referendum, the public at large. 
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state agency-heads to “ensure non-discrimination” in hiring and 
promotion based on, among other things, “sexual orientation.”  I 
do not mean to be critical of these legislative successes; homo-
sexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of 
their moral sentiments as is the rest of society. But they are subject 
to being countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as 
well.16 
The legal process of the culture wars becomes much more controversial 
and problematic when the focus shifts from legislation to litigation, from 
the statehouse to the courthouse.  Our confidence in the fairness of the 
process is shaken when strongly divisive issues that will impact the future 
of our society, including “marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education,”17 are decided not by a majority 
of the people, or by the people’s duly-elected representatives, but rather by 
a handful of unelected, politically unaccountable judges.18  Unfortunately, 
this has become the dominant pattern of the culture wars.  Issue after issue 
is decided by five members of the United States Supreme Court19—in many 
cases a narrowly-divided Supreme Court, so that the policy preferences of 
Sandra Day O’Connor or Anthony Kennedy become the law of the land,20 
imposing their views of the Good Life on the rest of the nation.  This raises 
serious questions about the legitimacy and desirability of the policy-making 
process, and those questions are the focus of this article. 
Under our constitutional system of government, the people’s repre-
sentatives in legislative branches (national, state, and local) are designed to 
be the primary makers of public policy.21  In the national government, 
 
16. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
17. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
18. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1989). 
19. It takes five of nine Justices to make a majority opinion of the Supreme Court the 
supreme law of the land.  Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is 
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . .  It follows that the interpretation of 
the [Constitution] enunciated by this Court . . . is the supreme law of the land.”). 
20. To see the typical closeness of Supreme Court decisions in this area, compare Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1615-18 (2007) with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  In 
Stenberg, Justice Kennedy dissented, disagreeing with Justice Breyer that the abortion regulations 
at issue violated the test articulated in Casey, a case where Kennedy and O’Connor agreed, res-
ulting in the overturning of certain abortion regulations.  By the time of Gonzales, O’Connor was 
no longer on the Court, and Kennedy’s view held sway by a slim 5-4 majority. Gonzales, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1618. 
21. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Gideon ed., 2001) 
(“The judiciary . . . has . . . no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and 
can take no active resolution whatever.”). 
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Congress holds “all legislative powers.”22  The national Government’s 
powers to regulate various areas of citizens’ lives are listed in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, which begins with the words, “The Congress 
shall have power.”23  Legislation is the process of writing and passing laws.  
By contrast, the President holds “executive power,”24 that is, he or she is to 
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”25 and the Supreme Court is 
vested with “the judicial power of the United States,”26 which is the power 
to decide real disputes,27 involving specified categories of litigants, which 
come before the Court.28  In other words, questions involving “What should 
be the laws of the United States?” are to be settled by Congress through the 
passing of legislation; the President and his Executive Branch carry out 
those laws and see that they are enforced; and if a dispute should arise as to 
the application or interpretation of the laws, it will be resolved through the 
judicial process and ultimately by the Supreme Court.  The courts, under 
our constitutional system, were designed to be passive arbiters of disputes 
between litigants, not policy makers.  As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist No. 78, one of the most famous passages in the Federalist Papers: 
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power 
must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated 
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Consti-
tution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure 
them.  The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the 
sword of the community.  The legislature not only commands the 
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of 
every citizen are to be regulated.  The judiciary, on the contrary, 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take 
no active resolution whatever.  It may truly be said to have neither 
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of 
its judgments. 
 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“cases” and “controversies”). 
28. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
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This simple view of the matter suggests several important 
consequences.  It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond 
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it 
can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all 
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their 
attacks.  It equally proves, that though individual oppression may 
now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty 
of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so 
long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legis-
lature and the Executive.  For I agree that “there is no liberty, if the 
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and 
executive powers.”29 
Through most of our nation’s history, this would have seemed 
obvious—Civics 101.  But to our modern ears, there is a grating discord.  In 
a very short space of time, our culture has been converted to the belief that 
the Supreme Court, composed of our nine “Platonic Guardians”30 in digni-
fied black robes, is the governmental institution that resolves our deepest 
social tensions by telling us what the law is as it relates to some of the most 
important social issues confronting our nation.31  Of course, it is not at all 
new to suggest that the courts must “say what the law is” to decide a case 
properly before it; a court must interpret the applicable law and determine 
how it affects the legal rights of the litigants.32  What is relatively new, 
however, is the almost-universal assumption that our most socially-divisive 
legal issues will ultimately be resolved not by our elected representatives in 
Congress, but by the Supreme Court.  And if the Court’s resolution of the 
issue seems wrong to a majority, or even a vast majority, of the American 
people and our elected representatives, there is little that we can do about it.  
Our only recourse is a constitutional amendment,33 which is, by design, 
 
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 21, at 402 (citations omitted).  Hamilton quoted the 
famous political philosopher Montesquieu who wrote “Of the three powers above mentioned, the 
judiciary is next to nothing.”  CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
LAWS 177 (Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2003) (1900). 
30. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 73-
74 (1958). 
31. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning a criminal law 
against homosexual sodomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding an anti-abortion 
law unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (holding that an anti-
contraception law infringes on a fundamental right). 
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is, emphatically, the 
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to 
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”) 
33. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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very difficult to accomplish; in practice, amending the constitution may be 
even more difficult than the Framers intended.34 
Over the past half-century, the Court has moved more and more into 
the role of an active social policy maker, especially in areas where it may 
perceive that the elected branches are not moving fast enough to correct 
societal problems.35  How did this happen?  How did the “least dangerous 
branch” turn into our national guardians?  How did a nation of 300 million 
people come to a point where, on the most contentious issues of the day, we 
are One Nation Under Anthony Kennedy?36  There are probably many 
factors—legal, political, and sociological—and much has been written on 
the subject for both academic and popular audiences.37 
One major factor, certainly, has to do with the substantive breadth of 
constitutional law.  We will turn later to specific constitutional issues in-
volving marriage, sexuality, and the definition of the family.38  In general, it 
is clearly true that in the modern era the Supreme Court has moved from 
applying the test of constitutionality only rarely, when a legislative 
enactment clearly violated a textual provision of the Constitution,39 to much 
 
34. Louis W. Hensler III, The Recurring Constitutional Convention: Therapy for a 
Democratic Constitutional Republic Paralyzed by Hypocrisy, 7 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 263, 300-
03 (2003).  Theoretically, Congress and the President could also respond to an overreaching 
Supreme Court by impeaching, removing and replacing Justices who impose their own policy 
choices on the nation under the pretense of interpreting the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, 
cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6 & 7; art. II, § 4.  This has never been attempted (although President Franklin 
Roosevelt toyed with a similar idea in his “court packing” plan in 1936-37), and would be highly 
controversial.  See Christopher Shea, Supreme Switch?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2005, at D1 
(analyzing whether FDR’s controversial “threat” changed the course of constitutional history). 
35. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of the 
Supreme Court as a significant maker of public policy. 
36. It is too early in the Roberts Court to know for sure, but if it develops that the Supreme 
Court now has four fairly consistent “conservative/traditionalist” votes (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) and four fairly consistent “liberal/progressive” votes (Justices 
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) on issues such as marriage, family, sexuality, and abor-
tion, then Justice Kennedy’s vote will almost always be the swing vote that determines the 
outcome.  The entire focus of constitutional litigation could become an attempt to win Kennedy’s 
favor.  Consider, for example, the Casey, Carhart I, and Carhart II trio.  In Casey, Justice 
Kennedy joined O’Connor’s plurality opinion which invalidated on constitutional grounds certain 
state abortion regulations.  505 U.S. 833, 869-79. Justice Kennedy, however, believed that the 
abortion restriction in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-57 (2000), was appropriate, so he 
disagreed with Justice O’Connor and dissented.  When the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. 
Ct. 1610, 1618 (2007), addressed an almost identical issue, now that the more conservative Justice 
Alito had replaced O’Connor, Kennedy found himself again in the majority. 
37. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING 
AMERICA passim (2005); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS passim (1962). 
38. Infra Part IV. 
39. The Supreme Court first exercised the power of judicial review to declare a federal 
statute unconstitutional in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
It did not use this power again for more than half a century, until the infamous Dred Scott 
decision, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
       
1206 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:1199 
more expansive interpretations of the Constitution, in which the text is 
merely a springboard for the Justices to apply their own sense of funda-
mental fairness.40  Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Court has 
found statutes unconstitutional with greater and greater frequency.41  As the 
Court has turned more legal and public policy issues, previously the 
province of the legislature, into matters of federal constitutional law, it is 
not surprising that our culture has increasingly come to assume that policy-
making is the Supreme Court’s proper role in our constitutional system. 
However, there are also important historical factors to note throughout 
the last century.  The genesis of the policy-making Supreme Court came in 
the so-called “Lochner42 era” in the first third of the twentieth century, as 
the Court used “economic substantive due process” to invalidate state and 
federal legislative efforts to regulate wages and working conditions, and to 
pull the United States out of the Great Depression of the 1930s.  As one 
federal appellate judge described this period: 
The Supreme Court of the 1930s earned the increased scrutiny it 
received—along with FDR’s threat to pack the Court with jurists 
more sympathetic to his legislation—not solely because its 
decisions were “unpopular.”  Unpopular though they were, the 
Justices’ holdings were principally criticized for being little more 
than the thinly veiled and bluntly expressed policy preferences of a 
group of “Angry Old Men.”  They were, in short, grounded in 
nothing the public or the political branches recognized as the cus-
tomary reasoned basis for opinions of the nation’s highest court: 
the most noteworthy constitutional basis the Justices provided for 
their actions was the vague notion of “substantive due process,” a 
concept conspicuously applied in the now-infamous case of Dred 
Scott v. Sandford, which pronounced the constitutional right of one 
human being to hold another as property.43 
More recently, the modern era of using constitutional law to make 
policy seems to have built its energy out of Brown v. Board of Education44 
 
40. Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition,” 39 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 261, 265-66, 265 n.26 (2007). 
41. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (providing a dramatic example, in 
which the Court held unconstitutional all or part of some two hundred federal statutes that had 
made use of the so-called “legislative veto”). 
42. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
43. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Today’s Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the 
Federal Judiciary, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 175-76 (2003). 
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
       
2007] THE DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 1207 
and the civil rights movement.  Despite its positive impact on civil rights,45 
one unforeseen and negative consequence of Brown is that it seems to have 
given the Supreme Court the idea that it can jump in and solve difficult, 
divisive American public policy issues by pushing the nation to an 
enlightened future, even if public opinion and political institutions were not 
so sure about the enlightened course. 
The civil rights movement was the first major issue in our nation’s 
history in which private advocates deliberately used the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional decision-making—and used it very effectively—as a tool for 
engineering social change over a number of years and a series of cases.  It is 
not hard to understand why advocates opposing racial segregation and Jim 
Crow laws turned to the courts for remedies.  In the 1930s, 1940s, and 
1950s, there were strong forces for racism in the United States Congress 
and many state legislatures, especially, but not limited to, those in the deep 
South.46  It did not appear that legislation was the tool that would end 
legally enforced racial discrimination. 
Thus, advocates for racial equality turned to the Supreme Court.  Attor-
neys working with the National Association for Advancement of Colored 
People, led by the brilliant Charles Hamilton Houston47 and the master 
tactician Thurgood Marshall,48 devised an incremental strategy of litigating 
case after case,49 chipping away at the legal underpinnings of Plessy v. 
 
45. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96 (holding that racially segregated public schools violate 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus beginning the movement toward 
racial equality under law). 
46. Years after Brown was decided, many southern state legislatures were still fighting 
desegregation.  See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1968) (footnote and 
citations omitted): 
The respondent School Board continued the segregated operation of the system after 
the Brown decisions, presumably on the authority of several statutes enacted by 
Virginia in resistance to those decisions.  Some of these statutes were held to be 
unconstitutional on their face or as applied. One statute, the Pupil Placement Act, not 
repealed until 1966, divested local boards of authority to assign children to particular 
schools and placed that authority in a State Pupil Placement Board.  Under that Act 
children were each year automatically reassigned to the school previously attended 
unless upon their application the State Board assigned them to another school; 
students seeking enrollment for the first time were also assigned at the discretion of 
the State Board. To September 1964, no Negro pupil had applied for admission to the 
New Kent school under this statute and no white pupil had applied for admission to 
the Watkins school. 
Id. 
47. Leland Ware, A Difference in Emphasis: Charles Houston’s Transformation of Legal 
Education, 32 HOW. L.J. 479, 479 (1989). 
48. See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 
passim (1998). 
49. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950). 
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Ferguson50 and legalized segregation.  Their strategy culminated in the 
1954 Brown decision, which, while it did not immediately end government-
enforced racial discrimination in the United States, at least turned the corner 
and began the slow, difficult process of desegregation.51 
At the NAACP Marshall assisted Houston in the development and 
implementation of an “equalization” strategy that involved challenging the 
southern states’ failure to establish graduate and professional schools for 
black students.  Such a strategy allowed the NAACP to challenge discrimi-
nation without directly attacking the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.  The equalization strategy relied on the belief that southern states 
could not afford to maintain separate facilities for African American 
students that were actually equal to white schools.  After Houston left the 
NAACP in 1938, Marshall became the director of the legal department.  In 
the years that followed Marshall won cases challenging discrimination in 
teacher salaries, housing, public transportation, voting, and criminal prose-
cutions. By the time Brown reached the Supreme Court a line of precedents 
had been established in which the Plessy rationale had been completely 
undermined.52 
All of this seems great from a position of fifty years’ hindsight.  It 
would be difficult today to find someone who would argue against the out-
come of Brown.  The notion that racial discrimination—certainly racial 
discrimination by the government—is a bad thing has filtered throughout 
our entire culture.53  The Supreme Court, or perhaps more accurately, the 
NAACP’s legal strategy using the Supreme Court, has been rather spec-
tacularly successful in the area of racial segregation.  The American public 
was not ready to demand racial equality in the early and mid-twentieth 
century, but the Supreme Court’s decisions led the way to a new, enlight-
ened way of thinking about race relations, and the American public fol-
lowed the Court’s lead, albeit slowly and with many fits and starts.  
Constitutional litigation succeeded in changing not merely the law, but the 
social fabric of the nation. 
 
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
51. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 394 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (stating that the process of 
desegregation should begin “with all deliberate speed”). 
52. Leland Ware, Book Review, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1392, 1393 (Dec. 1999) (reviewing 
WILLIAMS, supra note 48), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/86.3/ 
br_88.html; see also WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S 
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 29-34 (Jack M. 
Balkin ed., 2001). 
53. This does not mean that there are no longer individual racists, and pockets of group 
racism, in the United States today, as the author of this article (father of African-American 
children) is keenly aware.  However, these attitudes have become counter-cultural and have 
increasingly gone underground. 
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Problematically, in the fifty years since Brown was decided, virtually 
everyone—Justices and judges, Presidents, Senators and Representatives, 
lawyers, and the general public—has bought into the idea that constitutional 
litigation in the Supreme Court is the proper and primary venue for resolv-
ing divisive public policy issues and changing the public’s social con-
science.54  The people’s representatives, accountable to their constituents 
every two or six years, no longer hold the primary place at the policy-
making table, creating the often-discussed “countermajoritarian dilem-
ma.”55  One can argue that it is both fundamentally undemocratic, and 
totally against the Founders’ conception of our constitutional system, for 
major societal issues like the definition of marriage and the future of the 
family to be decided this way. 
In addition, the discourse of public policy debate has been cheapened: 
instead of a thorough study of the arguments for and against each possible 
outcome, litigants strive to express their positions as violations of various 
“rights”—some rights are clear under the Constitution, some more ques-
tionable, and others, such as the right to “be happy,” are downright silly.56  
Many have argued that this reliance on “rights talk” makes it very difficult 
to achieve wise public policy outcomes.57  But if courts are determining 
whose “rights” have been violated in hotly contested matters of social 
policy, it becomes crucial to know the source and meaning of those rights. 
III. THE SOURCES OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
Much has been written, by this author58 and others,59 concerning the 
source and identity of individual rights under the Constitution.  Rather than 
repeating that discussion in detail, a brief summary will suffice. 
 
54. This is not to say that the legislative process is never used today to resolve important 
public issues, even issues of fundamental rights.  See generally Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in 
the “Lobbying Nineties,” 84 NEB. L. REV. 795, 796 (2006).  However, even when legislation is a 
primary legal tool, there is often a sense that one has to wait for the Supreme Court to rule before 
really being certain of the outcome.  See id. at 826 n.131 (Rep. Jerrold Nadler expressing the view 
that Congress could simply enact legislation, even believing it to be unconstitutional, and allow 
the Court to straighten it out). 
55. BICKEL, supra note 37, at 16-23; Hensler, supra note 34, at 273-75. 
56. Jacob, supra note 40, at 275 n.80. 
57. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 
passim  (1993). 
58. Jacob, supra note 40, at 274-87. 
59. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557-73 (2004); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early 
American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of “Unwritten” 
Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist 
Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1988); Calvin R. 
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Although the Declaration of Independence built the case for the 
existence of the United States of America as an independent nation based 
individual rights arising from natural law, granted by the Creator60 and not 
subject to revocation or revision by the government,61 the original text of 
the Constitution contained very little specific protection for individual 
rights.62  Many of the Founders believed that it was unnecessary, and per-
haps dangerous, to list individual rights in the national constitution, because 
citizens’ primary protection from the federal government was found in the 
central government’s structural constraints and limited powers.63 
However, the arguments of George Mason and others who felt the 
absence of significant individual rights protections was a major weakness in 
the proposed Constitution64 brought about a political deal that led to the Bill 
of Rights being proposed and approved by the First Congress, and ratified 
by the states as the first ten amendments to the Constitution in 1791.65  The 
Bill of Rights, as enacted, placed restrictions only upon the national govern-
ment; it did not restrict the states in any way.66  The Civil War amendments 
changed the balance of federalism by creating new national constitutional 
constraints on the states.67  The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment68 was almost certainly drafted to provide substan-
tive protection of individual rights from state interference, but its value was 
 
Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 331-
32 (1987). 
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”) 
61. Id. 
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just 
powers from the consent of the governed—That whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, 
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. 
Id. 
62. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (rights protected from federal violation) and § 10 (rights 
protected from state violation). 
63. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 84, 85 (Alexander Hamilton). 
64. Jacob, supra note 40, at 276 n.89. 
65. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 83-84 
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD].  Ten of the twelve amendments proposed 
in the Bill of Rights were ratified in 1791.  One of the two that failed immediate ratification 
became the 27th Amendment more than 200 years later, in 1992.  Id. at 83. 
66. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV. 
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”). 
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largely destroyed within a decade of the Civil War by Supreme Court 
misinterpretation.69 
Because the Privileges or Immunities Clause was stripped of most of 
its meaning, and because the Supreme Court has never demonstrated a 
willingness to revisit that decision,70 efforts by the Supreme Court to 
enforce individual rights against state violation have primarily focused on 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment71 through the oxy-
moronic doctrine of “substantive due process.”  The idea that the substance 
of a law could so badly interfere with liberty, regardless of the legal 
process, that it “could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of 
law” was introduced by the Supreme Court in the infamous Dred Scott v. 
Sanford decision of 1857.72  This notion served as the backbone of the not-
quite-as-infamous-as-Dred-Scott era of Lochner and economic substantive 
due process.73  Although the point was not clear in Griswold itself, sub-
stantive due process is the heart of the Court’s modern “right of privacy” 
jurisprudence.74 
Even given the switch from the logical protection of citizens’ privileges 
or immunities to the illogic of substantive due process, and the initial debate 
within the Supreme Court about how many Bill of Rights protections ought 
to be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against the 
 
69. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).  See generally Jacob, supra note 
40, at 276-77. 
70. But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE points out, it comes as quite a surprise that the majority 
relies on the Privileges or Immunities Clause at all in this case.  That is because, as I 
have explained, The Slaughter-House Cases sapped the Clause of any meaning.  
Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause today, it fails to 
address its historical underpinnings or its place in our constitutional jurisprudence.  
Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has 
contributed in no small part to the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case.  
Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand what the 
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant.  We should also consider 
whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal 
protection and substantive due process jurisprudence.  The majority’s failure to 
consider these important questions raises the specter that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause will become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights, limited 
solely by the “predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this 
Court.” 
Id. (citations omitted) 
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
72. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). 
73. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
74. See infra Part IV. 
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states,75 there is today a pretty broad consensus that at most of the 
individual liberties identified in the first eight amendments now bind the 
states through their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendments.76  The 
trickier question is this: Does the Fourteenth Amendment protect any fun-
damental individual rights that are not listed in the text of the first eight 
amendments, or elsewhere in the Constitution from state interference? 
If one accepts the logically unassailable premise that original meaning 
textualism is the only appropriate method for interpreting the Constitution 
without destroying its purpose,77 then the very idea of nontextual rights 
starts off with two strikes against it.78  How can one interpret and apply the 
text of the Constitution by finding rights that are not in that text?  To state 
the question is to observe that it does not make sense.  In addition, the 
concept of courts applying nontextual rights through substantive due proc-
ess creates an enormous practical problem: What are those rights, and why 
should a handful of politically-unaccountable federal judges or Justices be 
able to decide what they are, sometimes over the objections of millions of 
citizens?  This has the potential to turn constitutional law into pure politics, 
an opportunity for the Justices to choose the political outcomes that they 
favor and force them on the nation. 79  As the Court itself has noted: 
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for 
this Court.  There are risks when the judicial branch gives en-
hanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guid-
ance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.  As the 
history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for 
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become 
 
75. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (“selective incorporation” 
approach) with id. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting) (“total incorporation” of Bill of Rights). 
76. OXFORD, supra note 65, at 491-92, 534. The only Bill of Rights protections that have not 
been incorporated by the Supreme Court are the Fifth Amendment right to a criminal indictment 
and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases.  Id. 
77. Jacob, supra note 40, at 264-74; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 
(2003). 
78. If one takes the “living Constitution” approach, of course, this is not a problem at all, as 
witness  the myriad of cases, books, and law journal articles written from that assumption.  See, 
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (find-
ing a constitutional right “to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the 
living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution . . . .”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 
(1973) (finding that “the abortion decision” is protected as a constitutional right, notwithstanding 
the absence of that right in the Constitution’s text and history); William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at 
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION 11 (Paul G. Cassell ed., The Federalist Society 1986). 
79. One might argue that the Court has often thoroughly exploited this potential. 
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the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members 
of this Court.  That history counsels caution and restraint.80 
On the other side of the equation, at least for the textualist, is the Ninth 
Amendment, which states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.”81  It is certainly possible to read the Ninth Amendment as textual 
confirmation that there are other fundamental rights that must be enforced 
by the federal judiciary.82  This is always tempting, because just about 
everyone, regardless of political perspective, can identify some rights that 
seem so incredibly important as to require judicial application if they are 
not appropriately enforced through the political process.83 
Although this conclusion may be politically tempting, it does not 
necessarily follow from the text of the Ninth Amendment.  One problem is 
this: If the text of the Ninth Amendment meant that there were other 
federally-enforceable fundamental rights, what would have been the 
constitutional means of enforcing those rights at the time the Bill of Rights 
was ratified?  The Ninth Amendment speaks of rights that are not contained 
in the remainder of the Constitution, including the remainder of the Bill of 
Rights.  Although there is a federal Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amend-
ment,84 the concept of substantive due process was not dreamed up for 
many years.  To say that the Ninth Amendment identified additional funda-
mental constitutional rights, which would later be enforced against the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment, is to say that these same funda-
mental constitutional rights were unenforceable against the federal govern-
ment when the Bill of Rights was ratified.  This, surely, would be a very 
peculiar textualist result. 
There are other reasons to believe that the Ninth Amendment does not 
affirm the existence of nontextual, fundamental, federal, judicially enforce-
able individual rights.  As one commentator has written: 
The proper understanding of the Amendment—“The enumeration 
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people”—is that it states a rule 
 
80. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (citations omitted). 
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
82. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
83. Compare the modern “right of privacy” discussed infra Part IV, which is generally 
viewed as essential by political liberals, with the right of parents to control the education and 
upbringing of their children, which is favored by many social and political conservatives. See 
generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”). 
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of what we today would call “nonpreemption.”  The specification 
of federal constitutional rights, possessed by individuals or by the 
people generally against the federal government (and a few pos-
sessed against state governments, set forth in Article I, Section 
10), was not to work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights pos-
sessed against state governments.  Such a disclaimer was neces-
sary (if at all) only to counter Federalist arguments (like 
Hamilton’s) that adopting a Bill of Rights might be construed to 
have such an effect, thereby enlarging federal power and dimin-
ishing individual rights.  The text of the Amendment, its political 
context, and historical evidence of its meaning and purpose all 
confirm this reading. 
Beyond this, one could infer a general political principle that the 
adoption in positive constitutional law of particular rights should 
not be understood to supersede the natural law rights of man.  
There would scarcely be much need to state this, however, as no 
one at the time would have assumed that human law could justly 
abridge God-given natural rights.  At the same time, no one would 
have mistaken the language of the Ninth Amendment as con-
ferring, as a matter of positive law, unspecified natural law rights.  
At most, the Ninth Amendment could be read as stating the truism 
that nothing in the Constitution legitimately could take away the 
natural rights of all human beings—including such things as life, 
liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right of the people as a 
collective to alter or abolish their form of government whenever it 
becomes destructive of its proper ends of securing those rights.  
The adoption of a Bill of Rights does not somehow repeal by 
implication the natural rights principles embraced in the 
Declaration of Independence.85 
The idea that there are no nontextual fundamental rights to be enforced 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, even with the assistance of the Ninth, 
may not only be the solution to the “personal predilections” problem, but 
also the correct textual interpretation of the Constitution.  However, at this 
point, this approach is even further from the mainstream of legal thought 
than original meaning textualism itself, and so may require some time to 
catch on. 
 
85. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Colloquium: How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not 
To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2047-48 (2006); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, J., 
Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS 
REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 196, 198-99 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). 
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If one accepts that substantive due process includes fundamental indi-
vidual rights not found in the text of the Constitution, is there no hope for 
an understanding of fundamental rights that has real, fixed meaning rather 
than mere personal opinions?  Have we at that point descended into 
constitutional law that is defined by the fads of the day, the personal 
opinions and idiosyncrasies of five Supreme Court Justices?  Is there, 
within that understanding, no way of restoring any principle or lasting 
content to fundamental rights jurisprudence? 
Only one possibility appears in the case law, although it has been 
observed as often in the breach as in the application.  This position is that 
the language of the Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment, permits 
judicial protection of rights not specified in the text, but only when those 
rights are self-evident86 to all, and only when they have been broadly ac-
cepted in Anglo-American law and culture for centuries.87  The Court, using 
this analytical approach, has said that in order to be judicially recognized, a 
fundamental right must be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and 
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.” 88 
For example, in its 1997 decision of Washington v. Glucksberg,89 the 
Supreme Court found that there is no fundamental constitutional right to 
end one’s life through suicide, or to seek assistance in committing suicide.  
Regarding substantive due process rights, the Court stated: 
We begin, as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our 
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.  In almost every 
State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime 
to assist a suicide.  The States’ assisted-suicide bans are not inno-
vations.  Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States’ 
commitment to the protection and preservation of all human 
life . . . . 
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has 
two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the 
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights 
and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they 
were sacrificed.”  Second, we have required in substantive-due-
 
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
87. See Jacob, supra note 40, at 281-83. 
88. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
89. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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process cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental 
liberty interest.  Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and prac-
tices thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible decision-
making,” that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process 
Clause . . . . 
The history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this 
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly 
all efforts to permit it.  That being the case, our decisions lead us 
to conclude that the asserted “right” to assistance in committing 
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause.90 
Justice Scalia, in his famous footnote 6 of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,91 
suggested an additional limiting factor to make sure that alleged fun-
damental rights are truly rooted in longstanding history: identify the right in 
question at the most specific level at which it could be identified.92  Thus, 
Justice Scalia asked whether there is a traditional fundamental right of a 
man to have a parental relationship with a child that he fathered through an 
adulterous relationship with another man’s wife, while the Court’s dis-
senters characterized the alleged right as “parenthood.”93 
This is not to say that finding nontextual fundamental rights through 
substantive due process is the correct interpretation of the Constitution’s 
text;94 instead, it suggests that even if nontextual rights are accepted as 
representing a legitimate methodology, they can still be limited through a 
focus on liberties that have been self-evident through centuries of history.  
This approach will prevent constitutional law from degenerating into the 
mere fads and current policy preferences of the Justices. 
IV. APPLICATION: GRISWOLD AND THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 
So far, this article has explored the ways in which the culture wars’ 
battles are fought in our society, and we have seen that the federal courts 
constitute a dubious forum for such battles.95  The constitutional text and 
history as the sources of fundamental individual rights were explored, and it 
was suggested that the correct constitutional understanding of judicially-
enforceable rights is that they are limited to those specifically identified in 
 
90. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 720-21, 728 (1997). 
91. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
92. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 & n.6. 
93. Id. at 128 & n.6. 
94. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
95. See supra Part II. 
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the text of the Constitution.96  However, if non-textual rights are con-
sidered, they can still be kept from total subjectivity by requiring that they 
be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”97  
It is time to bring the discussion back around to Griswold, and the defense 
of traditional marriage (that being, after all, the title of the article). 
Nowhere can the Supreme Court’s self-confident plunge into the 
resolution of social conflicts and the establishment of cultural values better 
be seen than in the realm of marriage and the family.  The Court in recent 
years has been reasonably consistent in grounding its decisions relating to 
marriage, family, and the creation and destruction of children in the liberal/ 
progressive culture wars camp, and in the remnants of the 1960s sexual 
revolution.98  One can argue that abortion has become the “third rail”99 of 
Supreme Court decision-making.  Whatever constitutional text may be un-
der examination, whatever other principles of constitutional law may come 
into play, when they come up against the right to abortion, they invariably 
lose.  As Justice Scalia noted: 
What is before us, after all, is a speech regulation directed against 
the opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the 
“ad hoc nullification machine” that the Court has set in motion to 
push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the 
way of that highly favored practice.  Having deprived abortion 
opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that 
abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues  
and expands its assault upon their individual right to persuade 
women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.  
Because, like the rest of our abortion jurisprudence, today’s deci-
sion is in stark contradiction of the constitutional principles we 
apply in all other contexts, I dissent. 
Colorado’s statute makes it a criminal act knowingly to approach 
within 8 feet of another person on the public way or sidewalk area 
within 100 feet of the entrance door of a health care facility for the 
purpose of passing a leaflet to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in 
oral protest, education, or counseling with such person.  Whatever 
 
96. See supra Part III. 
97. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
98. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
99. The reference is to the rail on a subway or electrified transit system through which high-
voltage current is transferred, so that touching a third rail is generally fatal. 
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may be said about the restrictions on the other types of expressive 
activity, the regulation as it applies to oral communications is 
obviously and undeniably content-based.  A speaker wishing to 
approach another for the purpose of communicating any message 
except one of protest, education, or counseling may do so without 
first securing the other’s consent.  Whether a speaker must obtain 
permission before approaching within eight feet—and whether he 
will be sent to prison for failing to do so—depends entirely on 
what he intends to say when he gets there.  I have no doubt that 
this regulation would be deemed content based in an instant if the 
case before us involved antiwar protesters, or union members 
seeking to “educate” the public about the reasons for their strike.  
“It is,” we would say, “the content of the speech that determines 
whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt prohibition.”  But 
the jurisprudence of this Court has a way of changing when 
abortion is involved.100 
In Hill, the case in which this dissent was written, the need to promote 
abortion rights triumphed even over such a core constitutional principle as 
the requirement that government not assess negative consequences against 
individuals based on their ideas, the content of their speech.101  And even 
Justice O’Connor, generally one of the Court’s progressive leaders on 
abortion, expressed the following view: 
This Court’s abortion decisions have already worked a major dis-
tortion in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.  Today’s deci-
sion goes further, and makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or 
doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an 
occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regula-
tion of abortion.  The permissible scope of abortion regulation is 
not the only constitutional issue on which this Court is divided, 
but—except when it comes to abortion—the Court has generally 
refused to let such disagreements, however longstanding or deeply 
felt, prevent it from evenhandedly applying uncontroversial legal 
doctrines to cases that come before it.102 
 
100. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741-42 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original) (citations omitted); see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
101. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-24. 
102. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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If abortion isn’t the third rail of constitutional law, then homosexuality 
certainly is.  Once again, in the context of a particular, and particularly 
divisive, social issue, all of the normal rules and assumptions of constitu-
tional interpretation go out the window.  When the Supreme Court decides a 
case under the Fourteenth Amendment and finds that no suspect classifi-
cation or fundamental right is at stake, it applies rational basis scrutiny.103  
To survive a constitutional challenge under rational basis scrutiny, the gov-
ernment need only show that its statute or action is “rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.”104  This is an exceptionally deferential 
standard; the government almost never loses under rational basis scrutiny, 
because government rarely acts in a way that can legitimately be charac-
terized as “irrational.”  Even if a judge disagrees with a particular law or 
public policy, the judge is almost never so arrogant as to say, in effect, 
“anyone who disagrees with me on this point must be insane.”  The one 
exception: cases involving homosexuality.  In both Romer v. Evans105 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,106 the Supreme Court made its decision without finding 
homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right, or those who practice it to 
be a suspect class, either finding would have triggered a more rigorous form 
of scrutiny, but rather by finding the amendment and the statute, respec-
tively, to be irrational.107  In the Court’s view, no sane person today could 
believe that these laws were legitimate public policy—notwithstanding the 
fact that throughout the centuries of Anglo-American legal history there 
have been many statutes prohibiting homosexuality and other extra-marital 
sexual conduct, and only a handful of very recent legislative acts granting 
legal protection to sexual orientation.  The Court has decided how it wants 
the culture wars to be decided, and popular opinion no longer matters. 
What is the common factor in these abortion and homosexuality cases?  
The Court assumes that sexuality is without moral content.  It assumes that 
sexual conduct between a husband and a wife, married for life and raising a 
family together, deserves no more respect and honor than sexual conduct 
involving an unmarried man and woman, or a gay couple, or two teenagers 
in the back seat of a car, or a group, or people and animals.108  The Court 
 
103. See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1988). 
104. Id. at 14. 
105. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (involving a Colorado constitutional amendment, adopted by a 
significant majority of statewide voters, prohibiting municipalities from creating special legal 
protections on the basis of “sexual orientation”). 
106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute criminalizing homo-
sexual sodomy).  
107. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580-85. 
108. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence, 
drew no distinction within sexual conduct, but described the issue before the Court as the freedom 
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assumes that the idea that sexual acts should be practiced only by a hetero-
sexual married couple is a quaint anachronism from a bygone era.  There-
fore, since the availability of abortion makes it easier for people to have sex 
without the complication of a baby, abortion is a good thing.109  And since 
marital relations have no more moral validity than unmarried or homo-
sexual conduct, it would be irrational for any jurisdiction to use its laws to 
promote its view of The Good Life in the context of sex and family. 
The positions that the Court is trying to promote are certainly rational.  
Many people in our society hold these views, and they are free to try to 
influence public policy through the elected branches of government.110  But 
the idea that sexual conduct outside of heterosexual marriage is a good 
thing that should be promoted and held without societal stigma is not the 
only rational response.  Even today, vast numbers of Americans disagree.  
 
of people “as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”  Id.  See also Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives 
may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike”). 
109. See Betty Friedan, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right, Speech at the First National 
Conference for Repeal of Abortion Laws (January 1969), in BETTY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY 
LIFE 171, available at http://guerillawomentn.blogspot.com/2006/02/betty-friedan-abortion-
womans-civil.htm. 
The right of woman to control her reproductive process must be established as a basic, 
inalienable civil right, not to be denied or abridged by the state.  What right has any 
man to say to any woman-you must bear this child?  What right has any state to say?  
This is a woman’s right, not a technical question needing the sanction of the state, or 
to be debated in terms of technicalities-they are all irrelevant.  This question can only 
be confronted in terms of the basic personhood and dignity of woman, which is 
violated forever if she does not have the right to control her own reproductive process.  
This is the only way that abortion is worth talking about; we’re going to demand it and 
see what happens. . . 
Id.  See also Margaret Montoya, Un/Braiding Stories About Law, Sexuality and Morality, 24 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 10 (2003). 
We must break this silence.  We should initiate an ad campaign that identifies those of 
us who have had abortions, those of us who have survived sexual abuse or sexual 
assaults, those of us who love other women.  This ad campaign should emphasize that 
our responses to sexuality are moral ones.  Good and moral women have abortions. 
Id.  Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption & Reproduction, 2 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 5, 12 (1995) (“[T]he recent edition of the Boston Women’s Health 
Collective’s Our Bodies Ourselves, takes an extremely hostile position on adoption.  The advice 
given to birth mothers is pure and simple: abortion is good, and adoption is bad.”); Stephanie 
Seguin, NOW Emergency Campaign Plans for Abortion Speakouts (2002), available at 
http://www.afn.org/ iguana/archives/2002_01/20020105/htm.  
Speakouts shattered the silence on abortion, showing other women that they were not 
alone, and indicating how the demand for abortion without restriction was a central 
part of the fight for women’s freedom in every realm . . . abortion isn’t always a big 
scary deal or something we did because we were “irresponsible”; it’s as simple as not 
wanting to have a child. 
Id. 
110. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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And there is certainly nothing in the text of the United States Constitution 
that appears to dictate answers to questions like these. 
The “culture wars” cases111 do not rest on broad societal agreement; 
although more Americans accept non-marital sexuality and non-traditional 
family structures now than in the past, there is no evidence that this has 
become a culture-wide consensus.  Just as importantly, these cases have no 
constitutional authority to support them.  Not one word in the United States 
Constitution speaks to the issues of sex, marriage, or abortion.  And even if 
one accepts the idea of nontextual due process rights, it is clear that the 
“rights” to have sex outside of marriage, to redefine marriage, to engage in 
homosexuality, and to abort children are neither “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,”112 nor “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”113  The Court’s discovery of these 
“rights” can be seen as no more than an effort to mold legal and societal 
policy from the bench.  “If Americans cannot understand sexual freedom,” 
the Court’s opinions suggest, “then we will simply impose it on them and 
they will, sooner or later, come to realize that we were right.” 
There are many problems with this approach.  First, it is illegitimate.  
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court no power to act as a national 
super-legislature on matters of social policy and cultural mores.  Second, it 
is not working.  Just as Roe v. Wade114 may be best understood as an 
attempt by the Court to end abortion’s divisiveness, which backfired by 
increasing division, there is no evidence that the Court’s attempt to redefine 
marriage and sexuality will, in the final analysis, persuade the American 
people.  All of these issues relating to marriage, family, sexuality and 
abortion continue to polarize American culture. 
 
111. In particular, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and other abortion-related cases which work to 
disconnect sexual activity from its marriage and family contexts, as well as Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
112. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).  It is not hard to imaging a free society 
with representative government and the absence of these rights, since the United States was such a 
society for most of its history. 
113. Id. The fact that these activities were subject to criminal proscription throughout most 
of Anglo-American legal history makes it quite certain that they have not been viewed as 
fundamental rights.  See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part); Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Whether homosexual sodomy was prohibited by a law targeted at same-sex sexual 
relations or by a more general law prohibiting both homosexual and heterosexual 
sodomy, the only relevant point is that it was criminalized—which suffices to establish 
that homosexual sodomy is not a right ‘deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and 
tradition.’ 
Id. 
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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Finally, this effort destroys the fundamental meaning and purpose of a 
written Constitution.  The Constitution is meant to act as an outer parameter 
for the actions of popularly elected governments.  It is difficult to amend 
because, as the basic ground rules of our political order, it should not easily 
sway with the political winds and social fads of the day.  If a majority of the 
Supreme Court can overrule the elected branches of government, without 
support in constitutional text, simply because they believe that the times 
have changed, then the Constitution is meaningless and we would be better 
off without it.115 
What, then of Griswold?  Modern substantive due process jurispru-
dence began in 1965 with Griswold, in which a Connecticut statute banning 
the use of contraceptives was held unconstitutional in its application to 
married couples.116  Because Griswold began the modern path of substan-
tive due process that led to Casey and Lawrence, it is easy for moral 
traditionalists to attack it.  And, indeed, there is much about the Griswold 
opinion to ridicule.  It accepts without any real analysis the idea that there 
are judicially enforceable nontextual constitutional rights, and it does so 
without even the honesty of a substantive due process analysis.117  Instead, 
the Court came up with the bizarre notion of “penumbras”118 of the First, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments that created constitutional 
“zones of privacy.”119  There is no way to defend any of this as an exercise 
to determine the correct meaning of the written words of the United States 
Constitution. 
But I have come to praise Griswold, not to bury it.120  Even given these 
weaknesses, if one can get past the use of nontextual fundamental rights, 
Griswold need not have been the disaster for traditional marriage, family 
and sexuality that its progeny have become and are becoming.  Griswold 
defined the right that it created in a way that survives analysis under the 
 
115. Jacob, supra note 40, at 264-74. 
116. Griswold, 318 U.S. at 485-86. 
117. By the time Roe came around eight years later, the Court had clearly identified its right 
of privacy jurisprudence as grounded in substantive due process.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept 
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is . . . is broad enough to 
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
118. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 
2006), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/penumbra (defining penumbra as “a 
partial shadow, as in an eclipse, between regions of complete shadow and complete illumina-
tion”). 
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases suggest that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those 
guarantees that help give them life and substance.”). 
120. With apologies to the Bard, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (“I 
come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”). 
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tests of “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”  
The Court’s opinion in Griswold was an ode to the traditional family based 
on the sacred marriage of a man to a woman.  For example: 
This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of 
husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that 
relation.121 
The present case, then, concerns a relationship [i.e., marriage] 
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental 
constitutional guarantees.  And it concerns a law which, in for-
bidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their 
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a 
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. . . .  Would 
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?  The very 
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship.  We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of 
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school 
system.  Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It 
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a har-
mony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not com-
mercial or social projects.  Yet it is an association for as noble a 
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.122 
I agree with the Court that Connecticut’s birth-control law 
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy . . . .  
My conclusion [is] that the concept of liberty is not so restricted 
and that it embraces the right of marital privacy . . . a right so basic 
and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of 
privacy in marriage . . . .  The Connecticut statutes here involved 
deal with a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy—
that of the marital relation and the marital home . . . .  Of this 
whole “private realm of family life,” it is difficult to imagine what 
is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife’s marital 
relations.  The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes 
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the 
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of 
 
121. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. 
122. Id. at 485-86. 
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similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically 
protected.  Although the Constitution does not speak in so many 
words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it 
offers these fundamental rights no protection.  The fact that no 
particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State 
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family—a relation as 
old and as fundamental as our entire civilization—surely does not 
show that the Government was meant to have the power to do 
so.123 
Surely the right invoked in this case, to be free of regulation of the 
intimacies of the marriage relationship, “come[s] to this Court with 
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties 
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.”124 
The legitimacy of government regulation of sexual conduct outside of a 
traditional husband/wife marriage was also emphasized by the Justices: 
The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation 
between this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of 
state concern—the discouraging of extra-marital relations . . . .  
Finally, it should be said of the Court’s holding today that it in no 
way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual prom-
iscuity or misconduct.  As my Brother HARLAN so well stated in 
his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, . . . “Adultery, homo-
sexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State for-
bids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an 
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an 
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always 
and in every age it has fostered and protected.  It is one thing when 
the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital 
sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another 
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inher-
ent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the 
details of that intimacy.”125 
This right of a husband and a wife to the privacy of their sexual 
relationship within the marital bedroom is one that meets the tests outlined 
in Palko, Glucksberg, and even footnote 6 of Michael H.  It is narrowly 
defined.  It is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” in that no free, 
 
123. Id. at 486, 491, 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
124. Id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in the judgment; citations omitted). 
125. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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democratic society has existed in human history that permitted the 
government to control the sexual activities of husbands and wives within 
their homes.  And it is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental,” because, as the Justices pointed out 
so eloquently in Griswold, the sanctity and privacy of marriage has been 
accepted through centuries of Anglo-American common law history.  As 
the Court mentioned in the 1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland,126 
which overturned a woman’s conviction for violating a local housing 
ordinance’s narrow definition of “family” by living with her son and two 
grandsons: “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the 
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is 
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”127 
Had the Supreme Court entered the culture wars only to the extent of 
Griswold, it would not have splintered our nation’s fabric as it has in 
subsequent decisions, which disconnected the “right of privacy” from its 
historical roots in marriage.  No doubt battles over marriage, family, sexu-
ality, homosexuality, abortion and similar issues would still be taking place 
even without cases like Eisenstadt, Casey, and Lawrence.  But without the 
Supreme Court cutting off the possibility of legislative resolutions for these 
culture wars, the political process would have been able to work as it was 
designed to do.  Political problems would move toward political solutions, 




126. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
127. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503. 
